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This work aims at presenting some hypotheses about the potential neurobiological sub-
strate of imagery and imagination. For the present purposes, we will define imagery as
the production of mental images associated with previous percepts, and imagination as
the faculty of forming mental images of a novel character relating to something that has
never been actually experienced by the subject but at a great extent emerges from his
inner world. The two processes appear intimately related and imagery can arguably be
considered as one of the main components of imagination. In this proposal, we argue
that exaptation and redeployment, two basic concepts capturing important aspects of the
evolution of biological structures and functions (Anderson, 2007), could also be useful in
explaining imagery and imagination. As far as imagery is concerned it is proposed that
neural structures originally implicated in performing certain functions, e.g., motor actions,
can be reused for the imagery of the virtual execution of that function. As far as imagi-
nation is concerned we speculate that it can be the result of a “tinkering” that combines
and modifies stored perceptual information and concepts leading to the creation of novel
“mental objects” that are shaped by the subject peculiar inner world. Hence it is related to
his self-awareness.The neurobiological substrate of the tinkering process could be found in
a hierarchical model of the brain characterized by a multiplicity of functional modules (FMs)
that can be assembled according to different spatial and temporal scales. Thus, it is sur-
mised that a possible mechanism for the emergence of imagination could be represented
by modulatory mechanisms controlling the perviousness of “modifiers” along the com-
munication channels within and between FMs leading to their dynamically reassembling
into novel configurations.
Keywords: imagination, imagery neural systems, functional module, volume transmission, wiring transmission,
modifiers, astrocyte networks, exaptation/mis-exaptation
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL PREMISES
The main topic of the present paper concerns the possible neu-
robiological substrate of imagery and imagination. Imagery and
imagination are commonly conflated concepts and indeed the
term imagination is often used to name the general faculty of
image production (Thomas, 1999). Despite the two terms sharing
obviously many semantic features, imagination usually indicates
the faculty of creating mental images and constructs of a novel
character, a capability that appears to be especially developed in
humans. In this view, the more basic faculty of producing mental
images of previously experienced material, i.e., imagery, provides
elements necessary for imagination and is arguably present also
in other species together with a primitive form of imagination,
namely a rudimentary form of prospection, i.e., the faculty of
creating a mental picture of a future or anticipated event.
For the present purposes, we will adopt the following provi-
sional definition of the two terms, based on a standard language
reference (Webster’s Dictionary, second edition, Prentice Hall
Press, NY, 1972) and the extant scientific literature:
- Imagery: the production of explicit and implicit mental pic-
tures or images. Implicit mental imagery occurs when perceptual
information is accessed from memory (Kosslyn et al., 2001),
giving rise to the experience of “seeing with the mind’s eye,”
“hearing with the mind’s ear,” and so on. By contrast, perception
(explicit mental image) occurs as a result of a form of energy
impacting directly on the sensory surfaces of the organism,
generally via a constructive process (see e.g., Thomas, 1999)1
1Rather than viewing perception as proceeding linearly from the inflow of sensory
data into the brain, the perceptual activity theory (adopted, e.g., in active vision
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- Imagination: the act or power of forming mental images of what
is not actually present or has never been actually directly experi-
enced. Notably, imagination not only has the potential to enrich
the meaning of an experience and deepen understanding, by
multiplying and expanding the perspectives from which a phe-
nomenon can be considered, but it also allows anticipating the
outcome of an action without actually performing it via a “sim-
ulation” process. At its peak, imagination is the very mental
faculty underlying visionary and creative thought.
The distinctive feature of imagination, therefore, rests on its
capacity of creating new mental images by combining and modi-
fying stored perceptual information in novel ways and by inserting
this information in a subjective view of the world: hence it is related
to his self-awareness. In other words, imagination is not simply the
organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory infor-
mation in order to represent and understand the environment but
rather a constructive process that builds on a repertoire of images,
concepts, and autobiographical memories and leads to the creation
(and continuous update) of a personal view of the world, which in
turn provides the basis for interpreting future information. Sum-
ming up it could be proposed that imagination represents the
ability by the human subjects of creating novel “mental objects”
that are shaped by their own peculiar inner world2. Given the
above general considerations, we would like now to turn more
specifically to neurobiology with the following distinction:
- Imagery is the capability of neural circuits to implement/provide
a representation of an object that is not currently present in the
subject’s sensory environment, but which the subject has had
previous experience of; as a limit case, a specific mental image
may even originate from an innate, genetically-encoded engram.
Imagery can trigger appropriate behavior as real environmental
stimuli do. This capability is thought to be present in several
mammal species especially in great apes. In humans, imagery
has been investigated in the motor domain (see below), visual
domain (Chatterjee and Southwood, 1995; Kosslyn et al., 2001),
and auditory domain (Zatorre and Halpern, 1993; Kosslyn et al.,
2001). A general finding of these studies is that the brain areas
activated during perception and during imagery overlap to a
large degree (Kosslyn et al., 2001).
- Imagination is the capability of neural circuits to combine
in novel ways images with a direct perceptual origin and
robotics), models it as a continual process of active interrogation of the environ-
ment: impulses in the optic nerve fibers at each moment of scanning a scene are the
answers, in code, to the “questions” that had been asked at the previous moment . . .
[What] goes on in the retina is not like the recording of a “picture,” but the detection of
a series of items, which are reported to the brain (Young, 1978). Each new “question”
takes its cue from the answers to the previous ones. See also the more recent formu-
lation of a similar idea within a Bayesian framework in Friston (2005) and Friston
et al. (2012).
2As an example, Romeo who thinks and sees with his mind’s eye Juliette kissing him
would be an example of imagery, while the reader of the play who creates in his mind
the scene of Romeo who thinks of Juliette’s kiss and thus enriches his inner world
with such creation would be an example of imagination. The terms fantasy and
fantastic (from Greek phantázein, “to present to the mind,” and phantastikos, “pro-
ducing mental images”) are strictly related to the concept of imagination detailed
here.
concepts to produce original images and speculations. Through
imagination, we are able not only to anticipate future events to a
certain degree, but also to enrich our sense of the world and even
conjure up alternative worlds, such as utopias3. Imagination can
also be strongly related to inner speech4, which is a feature of
human self-awareness and of crucial importance for the criti-
cal analysis of the virtual scenarios provided by the simulation
processes. In particular, simulation has been recognized as an
important mean for our understanding of social perception. In
fact, simulation can make it possible to know what it feels like to
perform actions, by recruiting neural circuits that partially over-
lap with those activated during the execution of such actions
(Jabbi et al., 2008; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008). Simula-
tion processes play an important role not only when we think
about the upcoming actions of another person, but also when we
think of our own future. Buckner and Carroll (2006) have sug-
gested that envisioning the future (prospection), remembering
the past, conceiving the viewpoint of others (theory of mind),
and spatial navigation are all specific instances of a more gen-
eral process of “self-projection,” which involve medial temporal,
parietal, and frontal circuits that also appear to have a high meta-
bolic activity during passive rest and have therefore been termed
“default mode network” (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001).
AIMS OF THE PRESENT PAPER
These introductory remarks provide a useful starting point to
examine the neurobiological relationship between imagery and
imagination. We propose that the concept of exaptation (Gould
and Vrba, 1982), introduced in the field of evolution, can be
extended to neurobiology and be of relevance to explain the
emergence of imagination from imagery.
A general scheme of the present hypothesis, and the main
assumptions of our argument that will be discussed in detail below,
can be summarized as follows (see also Figure 1):
- Some neuronal systems can have two capabilities: to perform
a function and to create in the internal theater of the subject
(Baars et al., 2003) the virtual performance by the subject of that
function. Clear examples are “mirror neurons” (Rizzolatti and
Fabbri-Destro, 2010) and “motor imagery” (MI) (Decety and
3The word comes from the Greek: oυ ("not") and τópioς (“place”) and means “no
place.” Utopia is an ideal community or society possessing a perfect socio-politico-
legal system. The word was coined by Sir Thomas More for his 1516 book Utopia,
describing a fictional island in the Atlantic Ocean.
4An extraordinary description of the links between inner speech and imagination
can be read in Marcel Proust (Swann’s Way; Place-Names: The Name): But if their
names thus permanently absorbed the image that I had formed of these towns, it was
only by transforming that image, by subordinating its reappearance in me to their own
special laws; and in consequence of this they made it more beautiful, but at the same
time more different from anything that the towns of Normandy or Tuscany could in
reality be, and, by increasing the arbitrary delights of my imagination, aggravated the
disenchantment that was in store for me when I set out upon my travels. They magni-
fied the idea that I formed of certain points on the earth’s surface, making them more
special, and in consequence more real. I did not then represent to myself towns, land-
scapes, historic buildings, as pictures more or less attractive, cut out here, and there of a
substance that was common to them all, but looked on each of them as on an unknown
thing, different from all the rest, a thing for which my soul was athirst, by the knowledge
of which it would benefit.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the main features of the
present hypothesis on the combinatorial aspects that by
assembling neural groups can lead to “imagery” and to
“imagination.” Details of the schema are briefly described in the
figure and discussed in the paper. It is also indicated the extracellular
matrix (ECM) as filler of the extracellular space (ECS) that can have a
role in modulating the assembling of neuronal groups and their
intercellular interactions (Agnati et al., 2006).
Ingvar, 1990; Decety and Grézes, 1999; Fleming et al., 2010). The
link between the well-documented properties of mirror neurons
and MI will be examined for its usefulness in shedding some light
on the largely unexplored field of the neurobiological substrate
of imagery.
Thus, the possible existence of “imagery neuron systems”
(INS) can be suggested and understood in the context of
the redeployment hypothesis and of the interaction-dominant
dynamics (Anderson et al., 2012). These concepts were proposed
by Anderson and collaborators to classify the types of dynam-
ics occurring among components of a system. In component-
dominant dynamics, behavior is the product of a rigidly delin-
eated architecture of modules, each with predetermined func-
tions. On the contrary, interaction-dominant dynamics is cru-
cially based on the plasticity of the system components and of
the communication modes among these components. Anderson
and collaborators maintain that the brain can be better described
as an interaction-dominant dynamics system where coordinated
processes alter the integrative action of components and where
it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to assign tightly defined
and unique roles to specific components.
- On this assumption we propose that an exaptation phenome-
non (Gould and Vrba, 1982) may have occurred during evolu-
tion favoring the emergence of imagination from imagery in a
neurobiological context capable of self-awareness.
- From a more specific neurobiological point of view a key char-
acteristics of these neuron systems that allow exaptation and
redeployment is their dynamical organization into functional
modules (FM). In the present paper and in previous articles
(see Agnati and Fuxe, 1984; Agnati et al., 2012a) we have pro-
posed that FM are organized according to a Russian Doll pattern
(Jacob, 1970, 1977) where networks of different scale are nested
within each other from cell circuit level down to the mole-
cular level. Notably, FMs have no anatomically well-defined
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boundaries but rather represent computational units where
transiently assembled, close-by structures cooperate in elaborat-
ing information and yielding an integrated response. It should
be noted that the three-dimensional organization of FMs allows
a huge number of combinatorial reassembling of the computa-
tional units encased at the different miniaturization levels within
each FM.
- The communication among and within FMs can occur via
the two modes of intercellular communication in the brain,
namely “wiring transmission” (WT) and “volume transmis-
sion” (VT) (see Box 1). By virtue of such communications,
supra-cellular networks can be created as “mosaic assemblies of
FMs” (Agnati et al., 2010a). An important role in this process is
likely to be played by astrocytes and by the extracellular matrix
(ECM), both in the structural and functional organization of
FMs and in the assembly of the mosaics of various hierarchical
orders.
In the present paper, we will speculate on how the combina-
tion of these communication modes in the brain can lead to the
emergence of imagination by dynamically modulating the com-
position of mosaic assemblies and intra-mosaic computational
processes. The combinatorial assembling of FMs into innova-
tive mosaics is made possible by the presence of “modifiers” (a
concept borrowed from the pioneering work of Alan Turing, see
Box 2) along the communication channels that can be made
by synaptic contacts (chemical and/or electrical) or by extra-
cellular fluid pathways in the brain where chemical signals can
diffuse. Given the variety of tasks that the brain can perform,
and particularly for the emergence of imagination in humans, a
“combinatorial optimization” mechanism that is able to find the
optimal assembly for a certain output from a finite set of brain
circuits is probably in operation (Lawler, 2001) and may play a
role also in prospection.
- On the basis of the above definition of imagination it is deduced
that imagination is possible only if the subject is capable of
a fully developed self-awareness (Hobson et al., 2006; Jackson
et al., 2012). Several authors suggest that the so-called Von
Economo neurons (VENs) are involved in the self-awareness
(Evrard et al., 2012) hence it can be surmised that VENs play a
role in imagination processes. In agreement with such a view
alterations in VENs have been described in autistic patients
(Santos et al., 2011) as well as an impoverishment of their imag-
ination capabilities (Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Low et al.,
2009).
It is clear that some assumptions of our argument have exper-
imental evidence, while some others are only testable hypothesis
or even speculations.
THE “IMAGERY NEURON SYSTEMS”
A cognitive task of particular interest for the present discussion
is that carried out by the so-called “mirror neurons.” As discov-
ered and investigated in several important papers by Rizzolatti’s
group, mirror neurons fire both when an animal acts and when
the animal observes the same action performed by another sub-
ject (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Thus, the neuron “mirrors”
the behavior of an activated motor neuron even if the observer is
not really acting (Figure 2A) hence it does sub serve two different
functions. Brain activity consistent with that of mirror neurons
has been found in the premotor cortex and the inferior parietal
cortex in humans (Rizzolatti et al., 2006; Ferrari et al., 2009). Such
neurons have been observed in primates, and are believed to occur
in other species including birds. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) experiments suggest that rather than mirror neu-
rons the human brain areas have mirror neuron systems (Iacoboni,
2009). As a matter of fact, fMRI studies in humans suggest that a
much wider network of brain areas shows mirror properties than
was previously thought (Gazzola and Keysers, 2009).
As pointed out by Rizzolatti et al. (2009), the mirror mechanism
is located not only in centers that mediate voluntary movements,
but also in cortical areas that mediate visceromotor, emotion-
related behaviors. For instance, when a subject observes emotions
in others caused by disgusting stimuli or stimuli representing pain,
the cingulate cortex and the insula are activated; notably, the same
areas are activated also when the subject herself experiences pain
or disgust.
In other words, the anterior insula and adjacent frontal oper-
culum (IFO) activate when individuals view or become aware of
the delight, pain, or disgust of others, as when they experience
these emotions first-hand, and this activation is modulated by
individual empathic tendencies. In agreement with these findings,
IFO lesions disrupt experience and recognition of disgust, suggest-
ing a role for this region in emotional simulation/understanding
(Jabbi et al., 2008). Both feeling emotions and recognizing emo-
tions in others appear to be mediated by an integrative mechanism
involving at least at a certain extent a common neural substrate.
In other words, the translation of a second-person observed
behavior into a meaningful first-person percept employs to a great
extent the same neural substrates which are involved in carrying
out that behavior. Extant data (see Molenberghs et al., 2012) sug-
gest that this holds true for motor behavior, visual, and auditory
perception as well as for emotions.
These findings provide the basis for a more general hypothesis
suggesting the existence of INS, that is, of neural systems capable of
making representations of objects and feelings of which the subject
has no direct experience. It may also be surmised (see Figure 2B)
that mirror neurons are part of such a broader system existing
in the human brain and likely in the brain of at least great apes.
Furthermore, it could be proposed that mirror systems and more
generally INS, by reflecting the relevant cues of the environment
use an “analog code” that is the most useful code for the task the
brain should tackle in that instance, e.g., a motor code in the case
of a movement, an emotional code in the case of a feeling.
It is worth noting that this hypothesis finds consistency with
two basic concepts that were proposed to capture significant
aspects of the evolution of biological structures and functions:
exaptation and redeployment.
The concept of exaptation has been introduced by Gould and
Vrba (1982) pointing out the different role in evolution played by
exaptation versus adaptation. While adaptation refers to a feature
produced by natural selection for its current function, exaptation
has been defined as a feature that performs a function but that
was not produced by natural selection for its current use (such
as feathers that might have originally arisen in the context of
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 296 | 4
Agnati et al. Neurobiology of imagination
Box 1 Intercellular communication in the brain has been previously proposed by us to occur according to the two main modes of
volume transmission (VT) and wiring transmission (WT).
Furthermore, since the integrative actions of the CNS depend on all cell types present in the CNS we have also introduced the concept
of “complex cellular networks” (Agnati and Fuxe, 2000). A complex cellular network (CCN) can be defined as the set of cells of any type,
which exchanges signals in a certain volume of brain tissue and, thanks to this cross-talk, is capable of integrating inputs to give appropriate
outputs. Volume transmission (VT) and wiring transmission (WT) can be distinguished based on the communication channels connecting
the signal source with the signal-target. In the case of cellular networks, VT is due to the three-dimensional propagation of the electrical
and/or chemical signal in the extracellular space of the brain (as well as in the cerebrospinal fluid) for distances greater than the width of
the synaptic cleft, by diffusion and/or convection. Wiring transmission is characterized by a structurally well-defined channel (a “wire”) con-
necting the source-node with the target-node, i.e., it is realized by the physical contact (gap junctions) or quasi-contact (chemical synapses
or membrane juxtapositions) between cells of the CCN. A high “transmission privacy,” usually present, due to the fact that the channel is
a private channel.
Since the extracellular space of the brain is filled up with the extracellular matrix (ECM), the composition and tightness of its three-dimensional
meshes has the greatest relevance on VT and also on WT (Agnati et al., 2006).
Box 2 In a fascinating and farsighted report written in 1948,Turing (1994) suggested that the infant human cortex could be seen
as an instance of an “unorganized machine.”
Turing defined the class of unorganized machines as largely random in their initial construction, but capable of being trained to perform
particular tasks. There is good reason to consider the infant cortex “unorganized” in this sense: there is insufficient storage capacity in
the DNA which controls the construction of the central nervous system to exactly specify the position and connectivity of every neuron
and by not hard-wiring brain function before birth we are able to learn language and other socially important behaviors which carry great
evolutionary advantage.
Turing gives two examples of artificial unorganized machines, which he claims are about the simplest possible models of the nervous
system: the Type A-machines and the Type B-machines.
The present paper considers theType B-machines that can be described as a network where the perviousness of the inter-node connections
are under the control of a connection modifier which can be in two opposite states: the pass mode or the interrupt mode. The connection
modifiers greatly facilitate training by an external agent by allowing functional modifications to be made at any point in the network.
Turing also discussed input, output, and training structures for B-type machines and the possible role of “teaching signals” acting on the
state of the modifiers (Turing, 1994). Turing mainly considered external teaching signals to be used for training the network function, but
he also discussed networks capable of self-modification. As most connection modifier settings do not result in useful network behavior,
Turing intended training to involve a systematic process where connection modifier settings are changed until the network is able perform
a desired task. A set of useful modifier settings would constitute a kind of fixed program for the network.Thus, by way of such training and
functional manipulation and via redeployment of the interconnected neural groups, multiple networks will be transiently formed and, even
when the mosaics forming the network contain a limited number of tesserae, a very large repertoire of outputs would be possible.
selection for insulation and not for flying; see, e.g., Xu et al., 2012).
However, natural selection may subsequently operate upon such a
new function to better adapt it to the possible new environmental
requests.
In a somewhat similar theoretical frame Anderson has intro-
duced the concept of evolutionary redeployment (or reuse)
of a neural structure for a new function (Anderson, 2007,
2010). There are obvious advantages of redeployment of brain
areas and Anderson analyses this phenomenon in relation with
cognition.
From a general point of view it should be pointed out that the
acquisition of the capability of performing a new function by a
structure previously developed to carry out another function can
lead to two different possible cases:
- The acquisition of the capability of performing the new func-
tion is accompanied by the loss of the capability to perform the
original function;
- The acquisition of the capability of performing new functions
is accompanied by the preservation of the capability to perform
the original function. This case is probably better described by
the term “multiple redeployment” of the structure (Anderson,
2010). In this context Anderson, by a careful survey of neu-
roimaging data, has pointed out that, for example, the Broca
area is involved in multiple functional cognitive tasks besides
containing motor neurons involved in the control of speech
(Grodzinsky and Santi, 2008; Anderson, 2010).
Thus, the imagery capabilities can be described, according to
these theoretical frameworks, as a sort of redeployment process, in
which neural structures that are engaged in some action are also
reused for the imagery of events involving that action.
This raises a further question: which neurobiological substrates
could make possible such redeployment processes?
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BRAIN
NETWORKS
As briefly mentioned above, it has been proposed that the CNS can
be described according to two main organizational paradigms:
(1) The horizontal mosaic organization, that is, the more or less
stable assembly of structures, see Figure 3 (upper panel)
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the possible block
diagram representing the functional links leading to the “mirror
neurons” that is of neurons that neuron “mirror” the behavior of
activated motor neurons even if the observer is not really acting
(A) hence mirror neurons sub serve two different functions. In (B)
the hypothesis is put forward that some mirror neurons could be part
of a broader system, the imagery neuronal system, existing in the
human brain, and likely in the brain of at least great apes. The activation
of such a system is not necessarily dependent on a sensory input. For
further details, see text.
in mosaics capable of emergent properties (Jacob, 1977). It
should be noted that the concept of mosaic highlights the
importance of topology (spatial location of the tesserae), how-
ever the temporal pattern, i.e., the order of activation of the
tesserae of the mosaic, may also be crucial.
(2) The vertical (Russian Doll) organization (Jacob, 1970) of the
FMs [Figure 3 (lower panel)] (see above and Agnati and Fuxe,
1984; Agnati et al., 2007, 2012a; Guidolin et al., 2011). It can
be surmised that inside each FM there is a mosaic carry-
ing out a crucial function and this mosaic likely is formed
by synaptic clusters (SCs). Available data demonstrate that a
gradient of communication processes transiently originates
inside the SCs, which can recruit other structures (Shepherd,
1979; Golding et al., 2002). Thus, each FM is a computational
unit only loosely delimited in functional terms, which sends
integrated outputs to other FMs. Further details of such a
paradigm are given below and have been discussed elsewhere
(Agnati et al., 2012a).
Let us briefly discuss in more detail the neurobiological mech-
anisms capable of affecting FM boundaries, mosaic assembly and
intra-mosaic dynamics.
As far as the FM boundaries are concerned, it can be
argued that in mammalian brain the astroglial cells define the
micro-architecture of the parenchyma by dividing the gray mat-
ter [through the process known as “tiling” (Bushong et al., 2004)]
into relatively independent structural units. In particular, the pro-
toplasmic astrocytes create micro-anatomical domains within the
limits of their processes that can play a role in organizing SC, given
that within these anatomical domains astrocytes isolate synapses
and send their processes to plaster the wall of the neighboring
blood vessels (Verkhratsky et al., 2011). Thus, astrocytes seem to
have a basic role in shaping FM structures and functions, especially
by affecting the possibility of SCs assembling.
Synaptic clusters are likely at the core of a FM by being a struc-
tural and functional bridge between the cellular networks and
the molecular networks. It should be noticed that SCs have been
shown to be very plastic entities from both the structural (Holt-
maat et al., 2005) and the functional (Welzel et al., 2010) point of
view. Notably, it has been reported that plastic changes induced by
long term potentiation (LTP) at one synaptic contact lowers the
threshold for the induction of LTP at neighboring synapses at a
stimulation strength that did not cause any plastic changes under
control conditions (Golding et al., 2002).
The extent of this sensitized plasticity zone spans about 10µm
of the dendritic tree and lasts for 10 min affecting neighboring
spines (Harvey and Svoboda, 2007). These characteristics allow
the SC to act as a sort of “intelligent layer” between the activity at
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FIGURE 3 | A schematic representation of the functional module (FM) as
a basic structure of the Russian Doll organization of the central nervous
system (CNS). The three-dimensional elaboration of the information inside
each FM is pointed out by remarking the horizontal elaboration that takes
place within a hierarchic (miniaturization) level and the vertical elaboration that
takes place among the various hierarchic (miniaturization) levels.
cellular level and the integrative functions performed at molecular
level by supra-molecular complexes such as those formed at the
cell membrane by G protein-coupled receptors, owing to direct
receptor-receptor interactions (see Fuxe et al., 2007; Agnati et al.,
2010b; Kenakin et al., 2010; for reviews).
The relevance of SCs can also be deduced by the possibility
of reverberating micro-circuits formed by the synaptic contacts
belonging to a SC. As pointed out in a previous paper (Agnati
et al., 2012a) a crucial quantitative difference in neuronal den-
sity (neurons/mm3 in layers I–VI) distinguishes the human brain
from other species. Neuronal density in the cerebral cortex is lower
in humans (24186/mm3) than in rats (54483/mm3) and mice
(120315/mm3), whereas the number of synapses per neuron is
higher in humans (29807) than in rats (18018) and mice (21133)
(DeFelipe et al., 2002). The number of dendritic spines of basal
dendrites of layer III pyramidal neurons also differs in mouse
and human temporal cortex. The mean number (mean± SEM)
of spines per 10µm segment is 10.9± 0.5 for cells in temporal
cortex of mice and 14.2± 0.4 with respect to the temporal cortex
of humans (Benavides-Piccione et al., 2002).
It should be noticed that a high density of synaptic contacts
per neuron allows several alternative pathways in the high density
local circuits of the human brain, and therefore a recirculation of
the information that may be of fundamental importance for keep-
ing information available for further integrations (DeFelipe et al.,
2002; Alonso-Nanclares et al., 2008), including those implicated
in memory processes (Agnati et al., 1981; Douglas et al., 1995;
Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Romo et al., 1999; Wang, 2001).
Functional modules in the brain could be assembled via both
WT and VT (see Agnati et al., 2010a) to form mosaics capable
of highly integrated actions. Furthermore, individual astroglial
domains have been hypothesized to be integrated into the super-
structure of astroglial syncytia through gap junctions localized on
the peripheral processes of astroglial cells (Verkhratsky et al.,2011),
hence potentially playing a fundamental role in the assembly of FM
mosaics. Actually, Pereira and Furlan (2010) have proposed the
existence of an active astroglial network functioning as a “mas-
ter hub” that integrates elaborations carried out by distributed
brain areas and supports conscious states. Following Kelso (2009)
FMs could be characterized as “synergies.”“Synergies” are systems
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exhibiting interaction-dominant dynamics; more specifically, a
synergy is a functional grouping of structural elements (mole-
cules, genes, neurons, muscles, limbs, individuals, etc.) that are
temporarily constrained to act as a single coherent unit (Kelso,
2009). In this perspective, each FM is a synergy (since its response
is the integration of the elaborations carried out at multiple scales)
and synergies are also the mosaics of FMs (see below and Agnati
et al., 2012a).
In this context a further organizational aspect deserving con-
sideration concerns the possibility (see Agnati and Fuxe, 2000)
that the communication pathway between a signal source and its
targets could be under the control of a “modifier,” responding to
teaching signals that could originate, for instance, from environ-
mental inputs. Such a modifier could be spatially situated along a
VT diffusion pathway and/or an astrocyte network connecting dif-
ferent FMs (Figure 1). It should be noted that this logical scheme,
in a loose way, recalls a feature of the Turing B-machine (see Box 2
and Turing, 1994; Agnati and Fuxe, 2000; Guidolin et al., 2007).
The modifier can be simply a suitable arrangement of glial
cells that can open (pass mode) or close (interrupt mode) the
extracellular space pathway via a differential swelling and thus
control slow VT communications between the source of a sig-
nal and its possible targets (Agnati and Fuxe, 2000). Suitable
signals could also affect gap-junction connections between astro-
cytes (Giaume, 2010) and therefore the fast transmission of the
information along this channel. The existence of such modifiers
could be of the greatest importance for the information transfer
through a master hub integrating such information by means of
calcium waves prompted by synergic factors and propagated or not
according to the opening and closing of astroglia gap junctions.
It should be noted how this proposal is basically in agreement
with our suggestion of the possible existence of modifiers along
the communication channels between the tesserae of mosaics and
hence the potential role of teaching signals addressing the flow of
information.
Altogether these structural and functional features could allow
a huge combinatorial possibility for the realization of different
computational assemblies (mosaics) between and within FMs,
leading to the extraordinary variety of the brain integrative actions
(see Agnati et al., 2012a). Different higher-order mosaics can be
transiently assembled by the same set of FMs, hence a multi-
redeployment process of the same brain areas can occur, allowing
the execution of markedly different brain integrative actions. In
the proposed FM mosaics framework, a key concept is that of
“reuse” of the same tesserae also within the FMs to build many
different mosaics capable of different patterns of activity leading
to different integrative actions. Thus, the just described organiza-
tion can provide a suitable substrate to the Anderson’s proposal
of the creative reuse of existing neural components (see above), a
concept which is also in line with the “tinkering principle,” pro-
posed more than three decades ago by Jacob (1977) who stated
that “evolution tinkers together contraptions and novelties come
from previously unseen associations of already available material”
(see Figure 3 upper panel).
In this respect, the present view not only proposes a neurobi-
ological basis for some general cognitive theories appeared in the
last 5 years (Gallese, 2008; Hurley, 2008; Dehaene, 2009; Anderson,
2010) suggesting that low-level neural circuits are used and reused
for various purposes in different cognitive and task domains, but
is also in line, to some extent, with Hebb’s classical hypothesis on
the possible existence of reverberating circuits interconnecting cell
assemblies (Hebb, 1949). It also shows consistency with the impor-
tant concept of “neural re-entry” introduced by Edelman (1999).
Such a concept indicates a process which coordinates neural maps
through the parallel selection and correlation of neuronal groups
in different areas of the brain and makes possible the emergence
of complex sensory and cognitive features. Thus, Edelman points
out that we ought to regard a complex system as one in which
smaller parts are functionally segregated or differentiated across a
diversity of functions but also as one that shows increasing degrees
of integration when more and more of its parts interact.
The main difference with the abovementioned theories is that
our proposal maintains that brain integrative actions are achieved
by means of communication processes among and within FMs
allowing a simultaneous “three-dimensional elaboration of the
information” (Figure 3 lower panel). According to the present
proposal of the CNS organization, for instance, it can be surmised
that neural re-entry could also occur within each FM, between the
networks of different miniaturization composing the FM itself.
In summary, we propose that redeployment processes could
occur at multiple spatial (and temporal) scales within and between
FMs belonging to brain regions not necessarily close to each other
anatomically, when cooperating in a cognitive task. This means
that a combinatorial interaction-dominant dynamics is in oper-
ation and this process is crucially based on the plasticity of the
system components (nodes and channels). As a consequence, dif-
ferent combinatorial assemblies of FMs can occur via the appropri-
ate resetting of the modifiers allowing the performance of different
functions by a restrict numbers of neural groups. Such a com-
binatorial reuse of the plasticity of the connections and of the
computational nodes allows the tuning of responses and may even
lead to the emergence of imagery and imagination in humans
and hence of a subjective fantastic realm that is one of the most
important source of creativity5 (see Figure 1).
ON THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF INTERACTION-DOMINANT
DYNAMICS IN THE EMERGENCE OF IMAGINATION IN
HUMANS
The above illustrated concepts could also be applied to the emer-
gence of imagination, starting from the evidence of the existence of
INS, and particularly from the well-characterized case of MI (see
Munzert et al., 2009, for a review). MI can be defined as a dynamic
state during which an individual mentally simulates a given action.
This type of phenomenal experience implies that the subject feels
herself/himself performing the action (Decety and Ingvar, 1990).
Thus, MI has been shown to involve the conscious internal
representation of movement, without overt motor performance
5It should be noted that an objective record of the fantastic realm of a subject’s,
i.e., an important part of his inner world can be at least in part gathered by an
observer if and only if these mental objects, once translated in artworks, appear to the
observer not simply bizarre but rich of a mysterious meaning (see Caillois, 1965) and
appears to be the result of a creative process. Actually, creativity has been defined as
the capability of producing new contraptions that have a meaning or a utility and,
hence, are not simply trivial or bizarre objects (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999).
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(Decety and Grézes, 1999; Fleming et al., 2010). Similarities in
brain activation between MI and actual movement have also been
demonstrated by fMRI (Gerardin et al., 2000). Actually, during
imagined and executed finger movements, common areas of brain
activation can be observed in the premotor cortex, supplemen-
tary motor area, and parietal cortex, with activation peaks slightly
more rostral in frontal areas and slightly more superior and caudal
in parietal areas during MI compared with movement execution
(Gerardin et al., 2000).
An overlap between executed, observed, and imagined reach-
ing activations was found in dorsal premotor cortex as well as in
the superior parietal lobe and the intraparietal sulcus (Filimon
et al., 2007), thus providing evidence for at least a partial overlap
between the neural circuits activated by MI and the mirror neuron
systems.
It is interesting to underline an important functional finding
that has been not yet explained namely that both the right and
left parietal cortices show greater blood oxygen level-dependent
signals during imagery than during motor execution (Fusi et al.,
2005).
In addition, the greater activation of the superior parietal cortex
during imagery than during preparation for movement, indicates
that MI is more than simply readiness to move (Stephan et al.,
1995). These results give further indications of the importance
of imagery processes and of the possible existence of INS that
may be in part overlapping mirror neurons systems, but may also
be independent from them not only as far as motor behavior
but also emotions are concerned (see below the possible key role
of VENs).
All these findings on INS can suggest that the emergence of
imagination in humans may be the result of two processes:
- Exaptation and/or redeployment of a peculiar type of FMs where
some type of INS plays a basic role in the integrative action of
those FMs;
- A peculiar interaction-dominant dynamics triggered by VENs
leading to the assembly of FM mosaics where FMs containing
INS have a hub role.
We propose that the activation of the INS and the assembly of
mosaics of FMs containing this type of neuronal systems may be
a prerogative of the DMN (Raichle et al., 2001).
Thus, we propose that in the human brain specialized INS,
possibly VENs, under the control of the DMN may provide the
neurobiological substrate for an effective massive redeployment
(Anderson, 2007) of local networks to many different higher-level
cognitive tasks such as imagery, prospection, and imagination.
In particular, we will discuss below whether INS can be part of
mosaics of FMs, which thanks to an interaction-dominant dynam-
ics and under the “creative” influence of the DMN form special
mosaics from which “imagination processes” emerge.
POSSIBLE REUSE OF IMAGERY NEURONS FOR IMAGINATION
PROCESSES
There is evidence that some mirror neurons are reused as INS and
that this reuse holds true also for emotional behavior. However,
it can also be hypothesized that in some instances an exaptated
process could have taken place, leading to the peculiar characteris-
tics of the imagery function. In this respect an important aspect to
consider concerns the process used by the brain to acquire knowl-
edge about the world. As pointed out by Zeki (2004), such a process
is basically a diffuse process of abstraction, in which each FM has
an abstractive machinery which transforms an incoming fragment
of sensation into a particular fragment of perception, i.e., extracts
a specific attribute of a sensory modality. Mechanisms of bind-
ing then allow these different components to be gathered into one
global picture, generating general models of the external world
(Blakemore, 1976). This process of generalization is a very effi-
cient way in which a finite mind grasps the infinity of particulars,
and also frees the brain from total dependence upon a memory
system (Zeki, 2004). It could be surmised that the development of
this ability could be the background on which the emergence of
the typical human capability of imagination could arise.
On the basis of the definitions of imagery and imagination
given in the introduction, it seems likely that the latter has emerged
from the former one. In fact, imagination is the capability of the
mind to create a hypothetical construct with concepts and images
originated from the environment (i.e., provided by imagery), but
also to fashion entirely new mental objects.
This assumption can be of some importance in showing a sort
of continuity between a more basic function provided by mir-
ror neurons, a higher-order one provided by INS (see e.g., MI),
and an even more advanced one leading to imagination processes.
These subsequent evolutionary achievements could have had a
high social value by favoring intra-individual empathy.
In agreement with Bloch’s fascinating proposal (Bloch, 2008),
also religious beliefs can be discussed under this perspective
since imagination allows humans to deal with things and beings
that do not exist physically. Thus, exclusively humans could
use what Bloch calls the “transcendental social” to unite with
groups, such as nations and clans, or even with imaginary groups
such as departed ones and gods. In Bloch’s view, the tran-
scendental social also permits humans to follow the idealized
codes of conduct associated with religion; notably, the very exis-
tence of the transcendental social presupposes the capacity to
assign a pregnant, “lived” meaning to the constructs provided by
imagination.
Is it possible to propose a neurobiological substrate for imag-
ination processes? The demonstration of MI in humans points
to the possible activation of FM mosaics by an internal input
that could or could not be triggered by an external input (see
Figure 2B). For example, Dagher et al. (2008) demonstrated that
abstract planning can activate motor areas even when the task to
be planned involves no motor activity by itself.
The exaptation of auditory INS may also have led to the emer-
gence in humans of the “inner speech.” This process is usually
characterized by a semi-constant, involuntary, and non-articulated
stream of verbal flow of associative thoughts that is perceived at
a conscious or semi-conscious level of mental awareness (Morin
and Everett, 1990; Morin, 2009); it could be argued that imagina-
tion plays a fundamental role for the inner speech, which certainly
plays a role for predictive psychic homeostasis that is strictly linked
to the subject prospection (Agnati et al., 2011). In the perspective
outlined in the present work, inner speech may rely on a special
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class of auditory INS exaptated for sub-vocal verbal and imagina-
tion processes. If such a proposal can be investigated and proved
it will allow a better understanding of the human consciousness
and possibly also of some psychopathologies such as schizophrenia
and autism.
Thus, it should be considered the possibility of a “mis-
exaptation” of imagination processes leading in the most clinically
relevant cases to intrinsic fuzziness and imprecision of brain func-
tion. This aspect has been discussed in a previous paper where the
possible functional and genetic links between schizophrenia and
creativity have been pointed out (Agnati et al., 2012b). Thus, in
some cases creativity may reflect not so much the functioning of
the brain but rather its borderline dysfunction hence when things
go a little wrong, that something new is experienced6.
As mentioned above, a special class of neurons, known as VENs,
could have an important role in imagination processes since they
appear to be involved in the cognitive process of abstraction. In
fact, only animals whose brains possess VENs pass the“mirror test”
of self-awareness (Gallup, 1970), which aims to ascertain whether
the animal possesses the ability to recognize himself in a mirror.
It has already pointed out that it is reasonable to assume that
self-awareness is a necessary platform for imagination processes
and therefore that exaptated VENs may be involved in such high-
level cognitive function. As a matter of fact, some previously
cited papers (see Introduction) report findings obtained in autis-
tic patients that support a link between alterations in VENs and
deficits in imagination processes. Thus, let us analyze the possible
role of VENs in this faculty.
ON THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL EXAPTATION OF IMAGERY: POSSIBLE ROLE
OF VON ECONOMO NEURONS
Von Economo neurons have been proposed to represent a neces-
sary neuronal adaptation in very large brains (especially chim-
panzees and humans), permitting long-range fast information
transfer and integration along highly specific projections, and that
evolved in relation to emerging social behaviors (Allman et al.,
2005; Premack, 2007; Butti et al., 2009). In the hominid brain they
are located in layer 5 of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
the fronto-insular cortex (FIC) (Seeley et al., 2012; Cauda et al.,
2013). In humans they have also been found in the dorso-lateral
prefrontal and in the frontal cortex (Fajardo et al., 2008). TheVENs
have a narrow dendritic arborization that spans the layers of the
cortex and may be able to sample and rapidly relay the output from
a columnar array of neurons. The apical and basal dendrites of the
VENs are remarkably symmetrical; this architecture suggests that
the VENs may be comparing inputs from these two symmetrical
dendrites.
6Unique mental abilities have been crucial for evolutionary success of Homo sapiens
and for the development of his complex social organization. However, these abili-
ties have also become a target for mental disorders which often result in a reduced
fitness and in conflicts between the individual and the conventions of society. To
account for this evolutionary maladaptation, we have advanced a new concept: that
of “mis-exaptation,” derived from S. J. Gould and E Vrba’s concept of exaptation.
Mis-exaptation is a characteristic which, although it may confer positive effects in
one field of activity, may reach an inappropriate degree of specialization to have
deleterious effects in that or in another field thereby leading to a decrease in fitness
of the individual (Agnati et al., 2012b).
The cell bodies of VENs in ACC are, on average, 4.6 times larger
than that of layer 5 pyramidal cells in this area (Nimchinsky et al.,
1999). The VENs’ large size suggests that they bear large, rapidly
conducting axons, which is a characteristic feature of large neurons
in layer 5 elsewhere in the cerebral cortex (Sherwood et al., 2003).
Concerning comparative anatomy, Premack (2007) cites evidence
showing that our species has not only many more and larger VENs
than apes, but also far wider perimeters of dendrites (an average
of 51µm in humans compared with 36µm in chimpanzees and
monkeys).
The dendritic architecture of neurons reflects the way in which
they integrate information (Vetter et al., 2001). Both spines (Saba-
tini et al., 2001), and branches (Polsky et al., 2004) can operate as
processing compartments, and, compared with their layer 5 pyra-
midal counterparts, VENs have fewer of both, which suggests that
the VENs receive fewer, but likely already integrated, inputs than
pyramidal neurons. Thus, the radially polarized structure of the
VENs could be a specialization for rapid signal transmission, pro-
viding an output that reflects the elaboration of the few highly
relevant integrated inputs from the neurons and astrocytes of the
FMs present in the ACC and FI to FMs of other brain regions.
Allman and collaborators tested adult human ACC and FI tissue
for reactivity to antibodies raised against the vasopressin and oxy-
tocin receptors. These authors have demonstrated that antibodies
specific for the Vasopressin V1a receptor label a subpopulation of
VENs, as well as pyramidal neurons in layers 2/3 and 5 of ACC
and FI. The pattern of labeling was interesting since apical den-
drites labeled with the V1a receptor antibody formed columns
that spanned layer 5 to layer 1 (Allman et al., 2005, 2011). It has
also been shown that VENs are strongly labeled with antibodies to
5-HT2B receptor (see below) and to the dopamine D3 receptor,
which is a high affinity dopamine receptor that has been proposed
to signal the expectation of reward under uncertainty (Le Foll et al.,
2002).
In summary, it could be argued that VENs are a special type
of “hub neurons” of FMs in the FI and ACC, which are capable
of integrating a selected few WT inputs and several VT sig-
nals (also broadcasted via the CSF channel). Thus, VENs may
carry out an extensive integration of multiple signals that can
be rapidly communicated via their large axons to distant brain
areas (Stimpson et al., 2011). This special role of VENs can also
be deduced by the above mentioned observation that human
VENs are located in only two parts of the human brain, the
ACC and the FI cortex, which have been implicated in socially
crucial processes, such as empathy, feelings of guilt, and embar-
rassment. In agreement with such a view, neuropathological data
demonstrate that the selective destruction of VENs, as in the early
stages of fronto-temporal dementia, is associated to profound
deficits in empathy, social awareness, and self-control (Seeley et al.,
2006).
The larger number of VENs in the right hemisphere may
be related to asymmetry in the central control of the auto-
nomic nervous system in which the right hemisphere is prefer-
entially involved in sympathetic activation, resulting from nega-
tive feedback and subsequent error-correcting behavior; the left
hemisphere is preferentially involved in parasympathetic activity
associated with reduced tension or calming responses.
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It may therefore be speculated that VEN predominance in the
right hemisphere in the postnatal period is related to the right
hemisphere specialization in humans, at least to the social emo-
tions that are of basic importance for self-consciousness (Allman
et al., 2005, 2011).
Furthermore, via their large, rapidly conducting axons VENs
may rapidly relay this information to other parts of the brain and
hence play an important role in the assembly of the mosaics of
FMs involved in the imagery processes.
HYPOTHESIS ON THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL MECHANISM ALLOWING THE
EMERGENCE OF IMAGINATION
Analysis of fMRI-based resting-state functional connectivity, using
both model-based and model-free approaches, has suggested the
existence of at least three large-scale networks in the human brain
(Sridharan et al., 2008):
- a central executive network (CEN), whose key nodes include the
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and posterior parietal
cortex (PPC), regions routinely activated during goal-directed
task performance;
- the DMN, which includes ventro-medial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), lateral parietal
cortices, and the hippocampal/parahippocampal cortices. The
DMN shows high metabolic activity and blood flow at rest but
is commonly deactivated during a variety of externally directed
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001);
- a salience network (SN), which includes the ventro-lateral pre-
frontal cortex (VLPFC) and anterior insula (jointly referred to
as the FIC) and the ACC.
Thus, during the performance of cognitively demanding tasks,
the CEN and SN typically show increases in activation whereas the
DMN shows decreases in activation.
There is a general agreement that DMN is associated with
stimulus-independent cognition (Buckner et al., 2008), however
the debate continues on the specific role of the DMN. In fact, it
is difficult to accept the view that such an extensive network with
its elevated activity at rest is only due to spontaneous thought
(Raichle and Snyder, 2007). It has been shown that the major
nodes of the DMN are functionally and structurally connected
and that this connectivity develops through ontogeny (Fair et al.,
2008) and becomes relatively weaker both in the elderly (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2007; Damoiseaux et al., 2008), and in patients with
attention-deficit disorder (Castellanos et al., 2008) and impulse
control disorders (Church et al., 2009). The DMN has also been
associated with phenomena such as self-referential processing,
autobiographical recollection, mind-wandering, and theory of
mind (Gusnard et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2007; Buckner et al.,
2008).
Based on these considerations, it can be hypothesized that
the high activity of DMN during periods of unconstrained “rest”
depends on the “creative” assembly of FM mosaics via the control
of the modifiers along the pathways interconnecting single FMs as
FIGURE 4 | Schematic representation of the default mode network
(DMN) in a redeployment process via a suitable control on modifiers
along communication pathways interconnecting FMs. Such a process can
be surmised allowing the assembly of FM mosaics that are not necessarily
dependent from sensory inputs. In support of such a hypothesis is the
observation that the DMN shows high metabolic activity and blood flow at
rest but is commonly deactivated during a variety of externally directed tasks.
For further details, see text.
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well FM mosaics into complex FM mosaics (Figure 4). Such a com-
binatorial process can be entirely decoupled from the inputs from
the external world and can therefore correspond to the mundus
imaginabilis proposed by Robert Fludd (Utriusque Cosmi, maiores
scilicet et minores, metaphysica, physica atque technica Historia
1617–1621; see Figure 5).
As schematized in Figure 6, it is even possible to surmise a new
type of “machine” made by computational assemblies intercon-
nected by pathways bearing “traffic lights” (modifiers) that can
divert the signals along many different routes. The computational
capability of this machine could be highly enhanced by a dif-
fuse system of extracellular signals capable of affecting the ECM
composition and/or geometry and hence controlling these traffic
lights. An interesting question is whether such traffic lights are
present, not only along the VT diffusion pathways and the Head
Master network, but also at the input and/or output level of VENs,
possibly as a pre-synaptic inhibition.
The putative crucial role of VENs is underscored by their local-
ization in the anterior insular cortex (AIC) and ACC, which could
be considered as input and output regions of a complex func-
tional system crucially engaged for the production of subjective
feelings and for coordinating appropriate responses to internal
and external events (Medford and Critchley, 2010). In fact, AIC
exchange information with ACC via VENs and, while AIC serves
mainly to filter and relay autonomic and emotional information,
ACC on the basis also of information from the prefrontal cortex
is involved in the production of high-level voluntary responses.
In line with the FM mosaic hypothesis, before triggering the final
output this synergy of different brain areas builds up a variety of
possible hypothetic scenarios and, among these, DMN is involved
in selecting the final choice.
Summing up, imagination could emerge from many different
peculiarities of the human brain, such as:
- redeployment of FMs containing possibly exaptated INS;
- especially developed connection-dominant dynamics allowing
the assembly of a vast repertoire of FM mosaics;
- a peculiar role of astrocytes with a high supporting function
allowing great plasticity of the components of the FMs espe-
cially SCs and, in general, favoring the assembling of a great
variety of different FM mosaics, e.g., via their “tiling” function
(Bushong et al., 2004).
A general theoretical scheme of the present hypothesis is illus-
trated in Figure 7. It should be noticed that remains unknown the
crucial issue of the neuroanatomical and functional features of
the control mechanisms that mediate concurrent activation and
deactivation within these large-scale brain networks during task
performance or during imagination processes.
THE PRESENT HYPOTHESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF AVAILABLE
THEORIES OF HUMAN IMAGERY AND IMAGINATION
It is well known that many psychologists of the behaviorist era
did deny the psychological significance of imagery. However, from
the late 1950s interest in imagery gradually increased (Holt, 1964)
and from the later 1960s a number of experimental findings (see
Morris and Hampson, 1983) convinced many researchers of its
FIGURE 5 | Inspiring drawing from Robert Fludd masterpiece
(Utriusque Cosmi, maiores scilicet et minores, metaphysica, physica
atque technica Historia 1617–1621). In agreement with our proposal the
imagination process can be considered as Fludd’s mundus imaginabilis
hence a process that can be entirely decoupled from the input of the
external world.
cognitive significance, stimulating the development of theories on
the nature and mechanism of imagery (see Pylyshyn, 2002). As
pointed out by Thomas (1999), the extant theories proposed by
cognitive sciences can be categorized according to three basic types
that can be better understood as “research programs,” each char-
acterized by certain explanatory strategies, but encompassing a
number of diverse theoretical positions:
• The “quasi-pictorial” class of theories (Kosslyn, 1980) holds that
quasi-pictures are constructed on the basis of sensory infor-
mation in the form of “deep representations” and stored in
functionally defined loci (like the files saved by a computer pro-
gram). Once established, such an information can be extracted
by a postulated “mind’s eye function.”
• The “description” theories (also known as “propositional” theo-
ries) share with the“quasi-pictorial”ones the idea that some type
of data structure is a proper model for mental content. However,
the data structures that they take to embody mental images (and
percepts too) are regarded as expressing propositions descriptive
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic representation of a new type of a hypothetical “machine” made by computational assemblies interconnected by pathways
bearing “traffic lights” that can divert the signals along many different routes. For further details, see text.
(in some inner language) of the relevant perceptual scenes
(Pylyshyn, 1991). When such structures are the end product
of perceptual processes, we are perceiving; when they are con-
structed inventively, or retrieved from memory, we experience
imagery.
• A different approach (not involving an information processing
framework) is represented by the “perceptual activity” theories
(Neisser, 1976) in which perceptual learning is not viewed as a
matter of storing descriptions (or pictures) of perceived scenes
or objects, but as the continual updating and refining of pro-
cedures (or “schemata,” see Neisser, 1976) that specify how to
direct our attention most effectively in particular situations:
how to efficiently examine and explore, and thus interpret, a
scene or object of a certain type. Imagery is experienced when
a “schema” that is not directly relevant to the exploration of the
current environment is allowed to exert at least a partial control
of the exploratory apparatus.
As extensively discussed by Thomas (1999) all these approaches
face theoretical and empirical difficulties. The first two, in par-
ticular, implicitly rest on a view of the of the brain as a pure
computational system or as a computational symbolic processor
which does not appear to fully fit with the morphofunctional
characteristics of the CNS as we know them today (Pani, 2002;
Guidolin et al., 2011). Furthermore, the acknowledged relation-
ship between imagery and imagination does not seem to be fully
explained within these theoretical frameworks. The “perceptual
activity” theories represent a field still under development, which,
however, appears promising for a psychological theory of imagi-
nation (Thomas, 2009). In particular, they account for perception,
imagery and imagination via a common mechanism (Thomas,
1999).
Unlike the abovementioned theoretical frameworks, the
hypothesis here presented is mainly focused on neurobiological
aspects. It suggests how a very general process (such as exapta-
tion and redeployment) could drive the emergence of imagery
and imagination capabilities starting from more elementary func-
tions. In this respect, the hypothesis here presented shows some
point of contact with “perceptual activity” theories. Moreover, the
reuse of the same substrates for different task domains (percep-
tion, imagery, imagination) seems also in line with the classical
view that “perception is a model in the brain” (Blakemore, 1976),
meaning that it is not a passive response to sensory stimuli, but is
rather an imaginative construction of possible perceptions which
are then tested against the input. According to the hypothesis here
presented, biological mechanisms making possible the process of
redeployment could rest on a peculiar morphofunctional organi-
zation of the brain (see §2), in which communication processes
among and within FMs allow the transient assembly of set of FMs
opening the possibility to explore multiple processing schemes
with the same basic structures.
Although a direct experimental demonstration or confutation
of the present hypothesis is not straightforward, the abovemen-
tioned features can suggest possible lines of experimental testing.
As far as the possible strong relationship between imagery and
imagination is concerned, of great interest would be clinical and
psychological investigations aimed at detecting the existence of
complete non-imagers who are otherwise normally conscious
and mentally competent. The question has been debated for
more than 100 years (see Galton, 1880, 1883), but no system-
atic research whatsoever has been done on the phenomenon.
Some recent paper (Faw, 1997, 2009) addressed the topic, but
giving only very sketchy details of the methodology and the
results.
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FIGURE 7 | General theoretical block diagram of the present
hypothesis illustrating in a highly schematic way the cognitive control
mechanisms that mediate concurrent activation and deactivation of
three large-scale brain networks namely the default mode network,
the central executive network, and the salience network during task
performance or during imagination processes. The detailed
morphofunctional descriptions of these networks and how their integrative
actions take place are still largely unknown.
Moving to more specific neurobiological aspects of the pre-
sented hypothesis, several experimental tests could be devised. Of
particular interest, however, could be to find out procedures to
evaluate the functional plasticity of the astrocyte networks, since
they play an important role in the functional organization (and
re-organization) of the FMs from specific interactions with single
synaptic contacts (De Pittà et al., 2012) to modulatory interac-
tions with entire neuronal networks (Schipke et al., 2008; Pereira
and Furlan, 2010). In this respect, experimental studies designed
to evaluate the amount of intra and extracellular factors (i.e.,
the “modifiers”) modulating of the gap-junctions in astrocyte
networks (Franke, 2009; Giaume, 2010) and comparing this para-
meter between different species (e.g., rat and great apes) could
provide some indication on the role of redeployment processes in
the higher integrative functions of the CNS.
FINAL COMMENT
It is worth noting that the present hypothesis suggesting some sort
of combinatorial capability of neural and molecular circuits and
the relevance of considering a three-dimensional elaboration of
the information by the brain may also shed some light on a ques-
tion that has been put more than one century ago: the importance
of brain size for human cognitive capabilities.
In fact, it implies that, beyond a critical threshold, the brain
size in different human beings is not a crucial parameter for their
cognitive capabilities.
As a matter of fact, it has been pointed out in a very interesting
article by DeFelipe (2011) that even a difference of almost 50%
of brain mass in humans may have no functional significance in
terms of intelligence.
Thus, not simply the increase in size but rather the com-
plexity of brain circuits seems to be responsible for our higher,
more abstract mental abilities. In particular, it can be surmised
that of the highest relevance are the specializations of our cor-
tical circuits made by complex cellular networks (i.e., mainly
neurons, astrocytes, and ependymal cells) and the density and
organization of SCs as well as the number and structure of
the VENs.
In conclusion, cognitive capabilities are largely determined by
the individual pattern of transient connections (i.e., the control
of the modifiers state) that via a combinatorial process can form
different FM mosaics. A further element of plasticity can be under-
stood when the vertical elaboration of the information associated
within each FM and its peculiarity, especially due to the integrative
function of SCs, is considered.
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